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Abstract 
A widely held view holds that it is permissible to conduct destructive research on embryos 
discarded following fertility treatment, but not on embryos especially created for research. 
One argument in support of this view appeals to the nothing-is-lost principle. It holds that 
because discarded embryos will die soon in any case, and something good is expected to 
come out of using them for research, it is presumptively permissible to do so. It is then 
claimed that no equivalent justification can be adduced in support of destructive research on 
embryos especially created for research. I argue that, on a standard formulation of the 
nothing-is-lost principle, this argument fails. I consider whether other plausible variants of 
the principle render the argument sound and argue that they do not.    
 
1. The discarded-created distinction 
Human embryo research has long been recognised as crucial to advancements in many areas 
of medicine, ranging from reproductive medicine to the treatment of childhood cancers. 
More recently, the possibility of generating and manipulating embryonic stem cells has 
opened up a new avenue of biomedical research. It may result in the development of 
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therapies for a wide range of currently incurable diseases and conditions, as well as novel 
techniques for drug screening and toxicity testing. 
Embryo research, including embryonic stem cell research, involves killing early embryos. 
This is problematic for those who regard the early embryo as having either the moral status 
of a person or a lower moral status that is nevertheless significant. Those who accord a 
significant moral status to the embryo are faced with an ethical dilemma: either one supports 
beneficial embryo research and accepts that entities of significant moral status will be killed 
for that, or one opposes beneficial embryo research and accepts that its potential benefits will 
be foregone.   
Since people are generally reluctant to give up on their deeply held views on the moral status 
of the embryo, many have looked for other ways to escape this dilemma. A popular strategy 
has been to adopt an ethical position intermediate between the dominant opposing views on 
the permissibility of beneficial embryo research. The aim has been to formulate a position 
that accepts some embryo research but is nevertheless compatible with the view that the 
embryo has a significant moral status. One such middle-ground position that has been widely 
defended and that has served as an ethical basis for stem cell policy in many western 
countries, including the US and most European countries, is 
The discarded-created distinction. It is presumptively permissible to conduct destructive 
research on embryos discarded following fertility treatments such as in vitro fertilization 
(IVF). However, it is impermissible to conduct destructive research on embryos 
created solely for the purpose of research or therapy.   
The discarded-created distinction draws a moral line between two types of embryo research 
based on the origin of the embryos.  
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The first type of embryo research is that on embryos left over after IVF treatment and 
donated for research.1 I will refer to these embryos as discarded embryos. The second type of 
embryo research uses embryos created solely for the purpose of research. I will refer to these 
embryos as research embryos. Experiments with research embryos could help us to achieve 
important research and therapeutic goals that would be much more difficult or impossible to 
achieve with discarded embryos.2 For example, research into egg maturation and freezing 
requires that eggs are fertilized in vitro and the resulting embryos monitored in the laboratory. 
This allows an assessment of the eggs’ ability to produce viable embryos. Research embryos 
would also be extremely useful for stem cell research. Especially the use of embryos created 
via somatic cell nuclear transfer or cloning would have several advantages over the use of 
discarded embryos as it would allow the production of stem cells that are genetically identical 
to the patient. 
The discarded-created distinction maintains that research on discarded embryos is 
presumptively permissible, but research on research embryos is not. The obvious question 
that arises is how it can be permissible to conduct destructive research on discarded embryos 
but not on research embryos given that both types of embryo have the same moral status.3 
Why is killing research embryos worse from a moral point of view than killing discarded 
embryos, and to such an extent that the latter is presumptively ethically permissible but the 
former is not? This question is important since restricting embryo research to discarded 
embryos rules out important research and therapeutic applications that could benefit a large 
number of people. 
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2. The nothing-is-lost principle 
One popular and intuitively appealing argument in defence of the discarded-created 
distinction holds that destructive research on discarded embryos is presumptively 
permissible since these embryos are never going to be used for reproductive purposes even 
if not used in research.4 The thought is that killing discarded embryos does not result in any 
loss that was not going to occur in any case. Gene Outka, for example, writes that  
...embryos in appreciable numbers have now been discarded or frozen in perpetuity. They 
will die, unimplanted, in any case. Nothing more will be lost by their becoming subjects of 
research.5 
It is then argued that because nothing is lost, and significant goods are expected to come out 
of research with discarded embryos, it is presumptively permissible to conduct such research, 
even if embryos have a significant moral status and it is therefore normally impermissible to 
conduct destructive research on them. It is further argued that an equivalent argument 
cannot justify destructive research on research embryos.6 
In a similar vein, George Annas and collaborators write that 
Although the destruction of a human embryo is lamentable, there is a considerable moral 
difference between creating and destroying embryos solely to obtain stem cells and 
destroying unwanted human embryos that will never be used for reproductive purposes, to 
achieve benefit for those with serious diseases and disorders. The former involves the 
creation solely for the purpose of destruction whereas the latter involves salvaging something 
of value from a situation from which nothing else can be gained.7  
The principle implicitly appealed to in these arguments could be formulated as follows 
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The nothing-is-lost principle (NILp). It is presumptively permissible to intentionally cause 
a certain loss that it would normally be impermissible to intentionally cause if (1) the 
loss is going to occur in any case, and (2) something good is expected to come out of 
causing the loss.  
Note that the application of NILp alone can only justify a qualified conclusion: that it is 
presumptively permissible to kill discarded embryos. For the killing of discarded embryos to 
be permissible, NILp should be correct, the conditions specified in NILp should be met 
and there should be nothing that defeats the presumption that killing discarded embryos 
is permissible. (One consideration that could defeat this presumption is that no parental 
consent was obtained to kill the embryo.)  
In what follows, I do not focus on possible defeaters. Instead, I investigate whether 
NILp presumptively justifies killing discarded embryos. If not, the principle cannot support 
the discarded-created distinction.  
I assume, for the sake of argument, that the embryo has a significant moral status, that is, 
either the moral status of a person or a lower moral status that is nevertheless high 
enough so that it is normally impermissible to kill embryos for research. The view that 
the embryo has significant moral status is firmly held and widespread. 
3. The nothing-is-lost principle and killing persons 
Suppose you like furniture made of tropical wood but agree that it is unethical to fell 
endangered trees to construct such furniture. One day you discover that an endangered 
tropical tree in your garden has a terminal disease. After careful consideration, you fell the 
tree to make a table out of it. Intuitively it seems correct that NILp could justify your action: 
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though it is perhaps normally impermissible to fell endangered trees to construct furniture, 
the tree in your garden was going to die soon in any case and something good – a beautiful 
table – comes out of your felling it.  
But can NILp plausibly be appealed to if the loss that is going to occur in any case is the life 
of a being of significant moral status, perhaps that of a person?8 If not, it cannot justify 
killing discarded embryos (on our assumption that these embryos have a significant moral 
status).   
Consider this slightly modified version of Bernard Williams’ famous Jim and the Indians case.9  
Tim and the Indians. Tim arrives in a South American town where twenty Indians are 
just about to be killed by a group of soldiers under the command of an army captain. 
The captain makes Tim an offer: if Tim kills one Indian, Mika, the others will be let 
off. If Tim refuses the offer, the captain will do what he would have done had Tim 
not arrived: have the soldiers kill all twenty Indians, including Mika. Tim wonders 
whether he could get hold of the gun and kill the captain and the soldiers, but it is 
clear that this is not going to work. Attempting this would result in all the Indians 
and himself being killed. 
It is somewhat plausible that it may be permissible for Tim to kill Mika because (1) the loss is 
going to occur in any case (Mika is going to die regardless) and (2) something good is 
expected to come out of Tim causing the loss (the other Indians will be saved). So it is 
somewhat plausible that NILp could justify Tim killing Mika.10 (Note that Williams did not 
use Jim and the Indians to illustrate NILp. I borrow the case because a slightly modified 
version of it shows that NILp could plausibly justify the killing of a person.)   
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4. The nothing-is-lost principle and killing discarded embryos 
Since it is somewhat plausible that NILp could justify killing a person, it is not yet ruled out 
that it could justify killing a discarded embryo. For the latter to be presumptively permissible, 
it will have to be true that (1) the loss is going to occur in any case, and (2) something good 
is expected to come out of causing the loss. 
Defenders of the discarded-created distinction have argued that (1) and (2) are true. For 
example, according to Gene Outka, who defends this distinction in the context of embryonic 
stem cell research,  
...it is correct to  view  embryos in reproductive clinics who are bound either to be discarded 
or frozen in perpetuity as innocent lives who will die in any case, and those third parties with 
Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, and other diseases as other innocent lives who may be  saved, or at 
least helped, by virtue of research on such embryos.11 
That others will expectedly be saved, or helped, thanks to embryo research with discarded 
embryos is not all that controversial. However, the first claim – that discarded embryos are 
going to die soon in any case – is far more controversial and has been challenged. I will thus 
focus on that claim in the next section. 
4.1. Brock’s stronger and weaker versions of the nothing-is-lost principle  
Will embryos discarded following IVF die soon in any case? According to Dan Brock the 
answer depends on how one understands ‘in any case’.12  Brock distinguishes a stronger and a 
weaker version of NILp. The stronger version appeals to the fact that the loss is going to 
occur given what anyone could do. In other words, whatever anyone does, the loss is going to occur. 
Brock rightly points out that the stronger version of NILp does not apply to discarded 
embryos as these embryos are frozen but still alive. Instead of being used for research, these 
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embryos could remain frozen, or be given out for adoption and carried to term. It is thus not 
the case that these embryos are going to die given what anyone could do. Note that the 
stronger version of NILp does not apply to Tim and the Indians either. It is not the case that 
Mika is going to die given what anyone could do. The captain could, after all, modify his plan 
and instruct the soldiers not to kill any Indians.  
The weaker version of NILp, as formulated by Brock, looks at what will happen given what 
others will in fact do (implicitly assuming that the agent in question does nothing). Suppose 
that a researcher has been offered a frozen discarded embryo and is deliberating about 
whether to perform destructive research on it. Even though it is true that this embryo could 
be used for reproductive purposes if the researcher does not perform the research, it will not 
in fact be used for such purposes. If not used for research, it will instead be thawed and left 
to perish by the IVF clinic. It could be argued, then, that if the discarded embryo will not in 
fact be kept alive, nothing is lost by killing it in research. Brock concludes that, although the 
weaker version of NILp does apply to the killing of discarded embryos, it should not be 
accepted by those who accord a significant moral status to the embryo: accepting the killing 
of a discarded embryo on this basis would be like accepting that a researcher who stumbles 
across an abandoned baby may use this baby in lethal medical research on the basis that it 
would have died anyway. Brock rightly argues that the correct response in this situation is to 
care for the baby. He further concludes that  
those who rightly reject this weaker version of the nothing is lost principle will argue that 
likewise, the alternative to destroying spare embryos in hESC [human embryonic stem cell] 
research is to keep them alive and frozen or to give them to others for implantation.13   
The weaker version of NILp, as formulated by Brock, is problematic indeed. The reason is 
that it looks at what others will do while assuming that the person whose particular action is 
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under moral consideration (henceforth ‘the agent’) does nothing, that is, assuming that she 
‘merely’ abstains from causing the loss (for example, assuming that she merely abstains from 
killing the abandoned baby or the discarded embryo). But why does Brock understand the 
weaker version of NILp in a way that focuses only on others? In the stronger version of 
NILp, Brock includes everyone’s future actions. The question there was whether the embryo 
could be saved by anyone, whether by the agent or by someone else. But Brock’s formulation 
of the weaker version of NILp ignores positive steps the agent could take to prevent the loss 
and focuses only on others. I believe that any plausible version of NILp should also take into 
account the array of future actions open to the agent. Surely, if the agent could prevent the 
loss, she should (as Brock points out). If she does not prevent the loss, she contributes to 
the fact that something will be lost that would otherwise not have been lost. However, there 
may be a situation where even though others could prevent the loss, they in fact will not, and 
the agent cannot prevent the loss, or it is reasonable to assume she cannot. This is the case in 
Tim and the Indians: the captain and his soldiers could prevent Mika’s death, but they will not. 
On the other hand, Tim cannot prevent the loss (recall that Tim wonders whether he could 
get hold of a gun but realises that attempting this would result in all the Indians and himself 
being killed).  
 4.2. The mixed version of the nothing-is-lost principle  
Another plausible version of the nothing-is-lost principle, which could perhaps justify killing 
a discarded embryo is what I call the ‘mixed version’. The mixed version combines the 
stronger and weaker versions: it looks at what others will in fact do and at what the agent could 
do.   
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The mixed version of the nothing-is-lost principle (mixed NILp). It is presumptively 
permissible to intentionally cause a loss that it would normally be impermissible to 
intentionally cause if (1) the loss is going to occur given what others will in fact do and 
regardless of what the agent does (from among the reasonable options), and (2) 
something good is expected to come out of causing the loss.  
I believe that what is crucial to any version of NILp is that the expected loss is a given relative 
to the agent: a fixed baseline from which it is determined that no further loss is going to 
occur if the agent performs the action under moral consideration. Different versions of 
NILp can then be understood as specifying different conditions for taking a loss as a given 
relative to the agent. For example, in the stronger version, the loss can be taken as a given if 
it will occur whatever anyone does. In the mixed version, the loss can be taken as a given if it 
will occur whatever the agent does, where the actual actions of others are themselves taken 
as a given.  
Applied to embryo research, mixed NILp implies that it is presumptively permissible for a 
researcher to kill an embryo if (1) the embryo is going to die soon given what others will in 
fact do and regardless of what the researcher14 does (from among the reasonable options15), 
and (2) something good is expected to come out of killing the embryo.  
That a discarded embryo is going to die soon given what others will in fact do and 
assuming that the researcher in question does nothing is rather uncontroversial. But will 
the embryo die regardless of what the researcher does, from among reasonable options? 
Not obviously. As Brock notes, the researcher may have the option of keeping the 
embryo alive and frozen or of donating the embryo to a couple who will use it for 
reproductive purposes.16 It might indeed be thought that taking one or the other of these 
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courses of action would prevent the loss from occurring. The first option is easier than 
the latter, but does it prevent the relevant loss? 
4.3. What is the loss? 
Whether the loss is going to occur in any case not only depends on the meaning of ‘in 
any case’ – the focus of Brock’s analysis - but also on what exactly the relevant loss is 
that is going to occur in any case. So far, I have assumed that it is the life of a being of 
significant moral status: that of the particular embryo the researcher considers using for 
research. If this is indeed the loss, then keeping the embryo frozen prevents it, as the 
embryo remains alive.  
However, perhaps the relevant loss is not the loss of the life of a being of significant 
moral status, but the loss of a valuable life of a being of significant moral status. If that is 
indeed the loss then one does not necessarily prevent it by keeping the embryo in a 
freezer: one does not thereby enable the embryo to realise a life of value. Indeed, it might 
plausibly be thought that the loss of a valuable life is the only morally significant loss at 
stake here. The loss of life per se is not morally significant. In that case, retaining an 
embryo in a freezer (rather than destroying it in research) achieves nothing of moral 
importance.  
Thus, it may be that, to prevent the loss, the researcher must do more than merely 
preserve the embryo in a freezer. Plausibly, she must ensure that the embryo is used for 
reproductive purposes, for example, by giving it to others for implantation. Is it 
reasonable to expect a researcher to do this? Defenders of the discarded-created 
distinction must deny this.17 They typically refer to the current regulations and realities of 
IVF practices in most countries. In the US alone about 600,000 embryos created in the 
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context of fertility treatments are stored in nitrogen freezers. Many of these embryos, if 
no longer needed for reproductive purposes by their conceivers, will be donated to 
scientific research. Once an embryo has been donated to research, it would be illegal for 
the researcher to try to rescue it by giving it to an infertile couple. This is because the 
conceivers of the embryo only gave their consent for research use and not for 
reproductive use of their embryo. The fact that it would be illegal for the researcher to 
rescue the embryo in this way suggests that it might not be a reasonable option for her to 
rescue the embryo.  
If the researcher cannot reasonably ensure the embryo is used for reproductive purposes, 
then it seems that mixed NILp could justify killing a discarded embryo: it is going to die 
soon given what others will do and regardless of what the researcher does among the 
reasonable options. NILp would then imply that research on discarded embryos is 
presumptively permissible. 
However, if this is true then mixed NILp could, at first sight, also justify killing a research 
embryo. If a researcher who considers using a research embryo suddenly decided against 
doing so the embryo would most likely be used by another researcher or it would be left to 
perish. It would die given what others will do (assuming the researcher does nothing). 
Moreover, it would die regardless of what the researcher does from among the reasonable 
options. After all, if it is true that a researcher cannot reasonably ensure a discarded embryo is 
used for reproductive purposes, then, for the same reasons, it must not be a reasonable 
option for a researcher to ensure a research embryo is used for reproductive purposes.18  
So far, I have established that, contrary to what Brock has argued, it is not yet entirely ruled 
out that a plausible version of NILp – the mixed version – could justify conducting 
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destructive research on discarded embryos. However, I have also pointed out that, if that is 
true, it is also not yet ruled out that mixed NILp could justify destructive research on research 
embryos. So how, then, could we back up the claim that NILp can justify killing discarded 
embryos but not research embryos? What makes the crucial difference? 
5. Why the nothing-is-lost principle cannot justify killing a research embryo 
It is often said that NILp cannot justify killing research embryos “since these embryos need 
not have been created for research in the first place”.19 But this cannot be the whole story. 
After all, one could simply reply that surplus IVF embryos that are going to die in any case 
should also not have been created in the first place.  Moreover, once research embryos have 
been created, for example by researchers in a country with permissive stem cell policies, the 
question remains whether it is permissible for a researcher to make use of these embryos, or 
the products thereof. 
Gene Outka gives a slightly fuller explanation for why he thinks NILp can justify killing 
discarded embryos but not research embryos. According to Outka this 
accords with the timbre of nothing is lost in that [in the case of discarded embryos] we 
encounter circumstances we did not initiate and that we wish were otherwise. That we 
contemplate doing repellent things that we would not do for their own sake indicates that 
intentional killing was not "part of our plan" from the start.20  
As I specified NILp earlier, it holds that it is presumptively permissible for an agent to 
intentionally cause a loss that it is normally impermissible to intentionally cause if (i) the 
loss is going to occur in any case, and (ii) something good is expected to come out of 
causing the loss. The above passage from Outka could be read as introducing further 
conditions: that the agent (iii) should not have initiated the circumstances she encounters, 
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(iv) should wish these circumstances were otherwise, and (v) did not plan to cause the 
loss “from the start”. 
Note that it is not clear how Outka’s conditions relate to one another. Is it enough that one 
of these conditions obtains, or do they all need to obtain? Are they really separate 
conditions? It could be, for example, that what really matters to Outka is that it was not the 
researcher’s plan to cause the loss all along, as specified by condition (v). Conditions (iii) and 
(iv) may be relevant only insofar as their satisfaction is evidence that condition (v) is also 
satisfied.  
Rather than seeking to determine precisely which of these three conditions Outka would 
want to incorporate into his version of NILp, I will explore, in what follows, whether any of 
these conditions might allow him to offer a plausible variant of NILp that can justify killing 
discarded embryos but not research embryos.  
(iii) One should not have initiated the circumstances one encounters 
Presumably, Outka’s idea in suggesting this condition is that a researcher who considers 
using a discarded embryo did not bring about the creation and discarding of that embryo. 
The embryo was created and discarded for reasons other than embryo research. It was 
created in the context of a fertility treatment and discarded because no longer wanted for 
reproductive purposes. It is only given these circumstances, which the researcher did not 
initiate, that she considers using the embryo for research purposes. It must then be assumed 
that a researcher who considers using a research embryo did initiate the creating and 
discarding of that embryo.  
The question arises, however, why it matters, morally, whether one initiated the 
circumstances one encounters. Suppose that in Tim and the Indians, it was in fact Tim who 
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captured and handed over the Indians to the captain, being perfectly aware of the fact that 
the latter would make him the wicked offer. When the captain makes the offer, Tim 
suddenly deeply regrets what he did. He does everything he can to reverse the circumstances, 
but alas, he cannot change the captain’s plan. It seems possible that Tim’s killing of Mika 
could still be justified under these circumstances, even though it was Tim who initiated them 
(and it was wrong to do so).  
Likewise, it is plausible that mixed NILp could justify research on research embryos if the 
researcher initiated the circumstances she encounters (for example, by creating the embryo 
in circumstances which ensure its early death), but now regrets this and tries, without 
success, to prevent the loss. 
(iv) One should wish the circumstances one encounters were otherwise 
Outka appears to be assuming here that a researcher using a discarded embryo wishes that 
the embryo was not going to die in any case. Indeed, according to Outka, the case for 
applying NILp to discarded embryos occurs in circumstances that are “lamentable”. “We 
welcome neither infertility nor excess embryos”, he writes.21 It must then be assumed that a 
researcher intending to use a research embryo does not think the circumstances are 
lamentable (presumably the evidence for this is that she initiated the circumstances, and it 
was her plan to kill the embryo all along). 
But why exactly does it matter that the researcher wishes the circumstances she encounters 
were otherwise? Again, consider a modified version of Tim and the Indians where Tim in fact 
does not mind shooting Mika. Indeed it gives him a pleasurable feeling. Though it might be 
hypocritical of Tim to appeal to mixed NILp to justify shooting Mika22 (as he does not 
consider Mika’s death a loss and, perhaps does not think it would normally be impermissible 
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to kill Mika), it is not immediately clear that from an objective viewpoint Tim’s killing of Mika 
cannot be justified by mixed NILp.  
Likewise, it may not matter, from an objective viewpoint, whether or not the researcher 
regrets that the embryo she considers using is going to die in any case.  
(v) Causing the loss should not have been the plan all along  
The thought here seems to be that a researcher using a discarded embryo did not plan to kill 
that embryo ‘from the start’, that is, presumably, from the moment the decision was made to 
create it. The embryo was created for reasons other than embryo research. By contrast, a 
researcher using a research embryo must have planned killing the embryo from the start as 
the entire purpose of its creation was to use it in destructive research. 
In Tim and the Indians, it clearly was not Tim’s plan, prior to stumbling into the village, to kill 
Mika. But suppose it was his plan. Suppose he had come to the village with the intention of 
killing Mika. Why exactly would it be the case that NILp could no longer justify Tim’s 
action? (Note that for it to have been Tim’s plan all along to kill Mika, Tim need not have 
initiated or contributed to the circumstances he encounters. It might just be the case that the 
circumstances that obtain happen to be favourable to Tim realising his plan to kill Mika).  
Again, it might be hypocritical of Tim to appeal to mixed NILp to justify shooting Mika. The 
fact that Tim planned killing Mika all along suggests he thinks killing an innocent person is 
permissible. But NILp is formulated as an exception to the rule that killing innocent persons 
is always wrong. It seems hypocritical, then, of Tim to appeal to NILp; this relies on a 
principle (killing innocent people is impermissible) that Tim is willing to disregard himself. 
However, it is not immediately clear that from an objective viewpoint Tim’s killing of Mika 
cannot be justified by mixed NILp in this modified scenario.  
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Moreover, returning to embryo research, it is not clear why a researcher using a research 
embryo must always have planned killing that embryo from the start. True, if the researcher 
created the embryo herself, or requested its creation, this is quite strong evidence for the fact 
that she planned to kill it all along. However, not every researcher using a research embryo 
must have created or requested its creation. A researcher could simply use a research embryo 
independently created by another researcher who no longer wishes to use it himself. 
So, where does this leave us? Outka’s criteria do not clearly license the conclusion that NILp 
cannot, from an objective viewpoint, justify any research on research embryos. Perhaps it 
might be possible to argue that some combination of Outka’s conditions might work, but I 
think there is a more promising route to take. 
5.1. The agency cost 
So far I have ignored a potential problem that afflicts my formulation of NILp, as well as 
other standard formulations that appear in the literature. Suppose that in Tim and the Indians, 
the good that comes out of Tim shooting Mika is not that nineteen Indians are saved (there 
are no other Indians in this scenario), but that someone in a nearby village receives a free 
meal at the local restaurant (so the offer is: if Tim shoots Mika someone will get a free meal, 
if he does not shoot Mika, the soldiers will shoot Mika and no one will get a free meal). 
Intuitively it is much less clear that NILp could presumptively justify Tim’s shooting of Mika 
in this modified scenario. Why is that? I suggest that to explain this, we need to modify 
NILp by adding a condition. This condition holds that for NILp to justify an agent 
intentionally causing a loss that it would normally be impermissible to intentionally cause, the 
good that comes out of causing this loss must be proportionate to what I call the ‘agency 
cost’. This is the moral cost of an agent being related in a certain way to the loss she causes, 
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for example, the moral cost of the agent causing the loss, rather than merely allowing the 
loss to occur. Many (in particular those appealing to NILp) would think that there is a 
morally relevant difference between Tim shooting Mika, and Tim allowing the captain to 
shoot Mika; when Tim shoots Mika, his conduct possesses a wrong-making feature that it 
would not have possessed had he merely allowed the captain to shoot Mika. This might be 
understood as an instance of a more general moral difference between doing or causing and 
allowing harm. But the agency cost does not need to be understood in terms of the moral 
distinction between doing or causing and allowing; it might also be understood in terms of, 
for example, the moral distinction between direct versus indirect harmdoing, or intended 
versus merely foreseen harm; indeed, it may even be understood in terms of the adverse 
effects of the action on the agent’s character.23 An agency cost exists whenever the agent’s 
particular relationship to the loss that she causes constitutes a wrong-making feature of her 
conduct, and the size of the cost is determined by the moral weight of this factor. It is this 
cost, I believe, which has to be proportionate to the good that comes out of the agent 
causing the loss. That is, I think, why it is implausible that NILp could justify Tim’s killing of 
Mika if the only good that came out of that was that someone in a nearby village receives a 
free meal. The good is not proportionate to the agency cost. It is not proportionate to the 
moral cost involved in the fact that Tim shoots Mika, instead of allowing the Captain to 
shoot Mika. 
If this is correct, then NILp should be modified as follows: 
The nothing-is-lost principle (NILp). It is presumptively permissible to intentionally cause 
a certain loss that it would normally be impermissible to intentionally cause if (1) the 
loss is going to occur in any case, (2) something good is expected to come out of 
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causing the loss, and (3), the good that is expected to come out of causing the loss is 
proportionate to the agency cost.  
So how could this help us find a justification for the view that NILp can justify killing 
discarded embryos but not research embryos?  
It may be the case that, when a researcher kills a discarded embryo, condition (3) is met (the 
good that comes out of killing the discarded embryo is proportionate to the agency cost), but 
that when a researcher kills a research embryo condition (3) is not met. 
Earlier, I pointed out that the good that is expected to come out of research with research 
embryos is at least as great as the good that is expected to come out of research with 
discarded embryos. Both types of embryo research hold enormous promise for preventing 
or alleviating human suffering. Since the good that is expected to come out of killing a 
research embryo and the good that is expected to come out of killing a discarded embryo are 
equally large, it must be the agency cost that is different. 
Though in both cases the researcher bears an agency cost because of her relationship to the 
present embryo’s death – for example, in both cases the researcher kills the embryo instead 
of allowing others to kill it – there may be another wrong-making feature that is only present 
when a researcher kills a research embryo, not when she kills a discarded embryo. If this is 
so, the good that comes out of killing a research embryo might be disproportionate to the 
agency cost involved in doing so, even though the same good would be proportionate to the 
agency cost involved in killing a discarded embryo. The question is, then, what this 
additional wrong-making feature could be.  
One important difference between Tim and the Indians and embryo research that I have 
ignored so far is that the latter is an ongoing practice rather than an individual action that is 
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unlikely to be repeated. It is unlikely that the circumstances which Tim encounters will occur 
again, let alone, recur on a regular basis. Thus, it is unlikely that Tim’s response to the 
circumstances he encounters will have any effect on whether similar actions are performed in 
the future. Destructive embryo research, however, is something that is typically done by 
researchers in a systematic way with legal endorsement. The circumstances in which 
(prospective) embryo researchers find themselves are repeated over and over. This makes it 
much more likely that a single instance of killing an embryo will have an effect on the future 
actions of others. It is this effect on others that I believe may help to explain why a killing a 
research embryo cannot be justified by NILp.  
How does a researcher killing a research embryo influence the future actions of others, and 
how does this offer an explanation for why NILp cannot justify it? 
First, by killing a research embryo, a researcher may soften attitudes towards embryo killing. 
She may thereby make it more likely that embryos will be killed by other researchers, instead 
of being donated to others to ensure their use for reproductive purposes. Second, by killing a 
research embryo, a researcher also contributes to a demand for more research embryos, 
thereby encouraging the creation of embryos doomed to never be used for reproductive 
purposes. To formulate it in Outka’s terminology: even though the researcher did not 
contribute to ‘the circumstances he encounters’ now, by contributing to a demand for more 
research embryos he contributes to the existence of future circumstances similar to the ones 
he currently encounters: circumstances which virtually ensure that each research embryo is 
going to die given what others will do and regardless of what an individual researcher does. 
Through this mechanism, a researcher destroying a research embryo encourages further 
embryo deaths.  
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However, if the researcher abstained from killing the embryo, and ‘merely’ allowed others to 
kill it, surely further embryo deaths would also be encouraged, though not by the researcher 
in question. So whatever the researcher does, further embryo deaths will be encouraged. 
Why, then, can NILp not justify killing a research embryo? The reason is that the 
relationship between the researcher and the future losses she contributes to by killing the 
embryo brings an agency cost to her action. The fact that she, rather than others, encourages 
further embryos deaths adds a wrong-making feature to her action, and this matters to those 
who appeal to NILp..  
Thus, when a researcher kills a research embryo, two losses occur – the loss of life of the 
present embryo and the loss of life of future embryos – and there is an agency cost 
associated with each. If the researcher does not kill the embryo, both of these losses will still 
occur, but in neither case will the researcher bear any agency cost.  
It could be argued, then, that when a researcher kills a research embryo, the good that comes 
out of it is not proportionate to the agency cost, though it would be if the researcher were 
causing only a loss to the present embryo. If that is true, then the third condition of NILp is 
not met and NILp cannot justify destructive research on research embryos. On the other 
hand, it might seem that NILp can justify the killing of discarded embryos, since in this case 
there is no question of contributing to further embryo killings. The discarded embryos are 
created, and doomed to death, by fertility doctors and their patients, and their actions are not 
likely to be influenced by the actions of researchers. 
6. Why the nothing-is-lost principle cannot justify killing discarded embryos 
I believe that this final step is too quick, however. By killing a discarded embryo, a researcher 
also encourages further embryo deaths. Although a society that accepts IVF is unlikely to 
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suddenly stop offering IVF treatments, it might still change the practice in such a way that 
fewer surplus embryos are created, and thus fewer embryos will be discarded. The benefits 
that flow from doing research on discarded embryos may weaken any incentive to 
implement or further develop forms of IVF that result in fewer discarded embryos destined 
to die. (The creation and freezing of surplus embryos is not a requirement of IVF. It is done 
to reduce harm and discomfort for the woman undergoing IVF. In some countries, 
including Italy, IVF is performed without the creation and freezing of surplus embryos.) A 
researcher killing a discarded embryo may also cause those already uncertain about the moral 
status of the embryo to feel increasingly comfortable about killing embryos, making it easier 
to accept that embryos will not be used for reproduction, and reducing efforts to help 
‘rescue’ embryos through adoption. Thus, it seems that by killing a discarded embryo, a 
researcher also contributes to the existence of future circumstances that are similar to the 
‘deplorable’ circumstances she currently encounters. As a result, a researcher destroying a 
discarded embryo also contributes to further embryo deaths. This adds the same wrong-
making feature to the researcher’s action as in the case of a researcher killing a research 
embryo. Both types of research seem to involve the same agency cost, for they both involve 
(i) intentionally causing the present embryo to die, and (ii) foreseeably contributing to future 
embryo deaths. 
Unless there is another reason why the agency cost of a researcher killing a research embryo 
is significantly24 higher than the agency cost of a researcher killing a discarded embryo, and it 
is now up to the defender of the discarded-created distinction to show this, we should accept 
that if the good that comes out of killing a research embryo is not proportionate to the agency 
cost, then the good that comes out of killing a discarded embryo must not be proportionate to 
the agency cost either.25 Thus, if NILp fails to justify killing research embryos because the 
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proportionality condition is not satisfied, it also fails to justify killing discarded embryos, for 
the same reason. 
7. Conclusion  
I have argued that the  nothing-is-lost principle (NILp) cannot  support the discarded-
created distinction. After establishing that NILp could plausibly justify killing a person, and 
thus a discarded embryo if embryos are persons, I considered Brock’s weaker and stronger 
versions of the principle. I agreed with Brock that neither of these versions can justify killing 
discarded embryos. I then developed a plausible version of NILp – mixed NILp – which 
could perhaps justify killing discarded embryos. However, it turned out that if mixed NILp 
could indeed justify killing discarded embryos, then it could also justify killing research 
embryos. I then considered Outka’s proposed specifications of NILp to see whether these 
could explain the claim that NILp can justify killing discarded embryos but not research 
embryos, but concluded that they do not clearly license the conclusion that NILp cannot, 
from an objective viewpoint, justify any research on research embryos. 
I argued that a more plausible route to take is to add a condition to NILp which holds that 
the good produced by an agent causing a loss be proportionate to the agency cost. I defined the 
agency cost as the moral cost of an agent being related to the loss in a certain way, for 
example, the moral cost of the agent causing the loss, instead of her allowing the loss to 
occur. However, I concluded that the agency cost involved when a researcher destroys a 
research embryo seems to be equally large as the agency cost involved when a researcher 
destroys a discarded embryo. The main reason being that whether one performs research 
using discarded embryos or research embryos, one encourages the creation of embryos that 
are doomed to be destroyed.  Thus, NILp cannot support the discarded-created distinction. 
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The principle either presumptively justifies both research on discarded embryos and research 
on research embryos, or it justifies neither. 
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